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I. INHERENT FUZZINESS IN PROPERTY LINES
There is more to property lines than meets the eye, and their complexities are
ever evolving. An underwater real estate rush extends 350 miles out from ocean
shorelines and includes oil and mineral rights beneath the ocean floor according
to the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention! Russia planted its flag on the ocean
bottom at the North Pole to controversially claim territory there,2 and the United
States is mapping arctic geologic features in anticipation of making claims.' Due
to difficulties in deep sea mapping, technical resolution of conflicting claims will
likely take years, if not decades. The politics may take longer. In an older but
more complex problem in the United States, the state of Georgia is seeking water
rights on the Tennessee River, renewing longstanding claims that its border with
Tennessee was wrongly surveyed in 1818 and extends a mile further north to the
thirty-fifth parallel under Congress's original instructions.4 Georgia has also
disputed limits on riparian water rights with Florida and Alabama for decades
despite tri-state water compacts.'
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, openedfor signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982).
2 Lee Carter, ArcticNeighbors Drawup Battlelines, BBCNEWS, Aug. 11, 2007, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/americas/6941569.stm; see also Commission on the limits of the Continental Shelf,
Submission by the Russian Federation, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcsnew/submissions-files/
submission-rus.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2008) (proposing outer limits of the continental shelf of
Russian Federation beyond 200 nautical miles).
3 Robert L. Hotz, U.S. Draws Map of Rich Arctic Floor Ahead of Big Melt, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 31,2007, ScienceJournal, availabk athttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB118848493718613526.
html (discussing American federal background preparation for prospective claims despite official
disregard for the treaty).
S. 82, 149th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007). See also Lori Yount, Georgia Lawmakers
Authorize Commission to Claim Tennessee River, by Negotiation or Court Order, CHATTANOOGATIMES FREE
PRESs, Feb. 21,2008, availabk athttp://www.imesfreepress.com/news/2008/feb/21/georgia-lawm
akers-authorize-commission-claim-tenne/ ("Georgia water sources supply 6 percent of the
Tennessee River's water.").
' The "tri-state water wars" dispute involves the apportionment of water between Georgia
lakes such as Lanier (a reservoir for Atlanta) and downstream rivers (the Chattahoochee hosts
freshwater species in coastal regions of the other states). The Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa Compact,
O.C.G.A. § 12-10-110 (2008), and Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L.
No. 105-104,111 Stat. 2219 (1997), were to settle disputes outside the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Peter A. Appel, Water Wars - Will Georgia, Alabama and Florida Ever Agree?, ADVoCATE 10
(Spring/Summer 2007), availablkathttp://www.law.uga.edu/news/advocate/spring2007/waterwars.
pdf (discussing the legal and political history of the tri-state water wars). The dispute goes on:
recent Georgia lake waterlines are fifteen vertical feet below historic averages due to drought, but
the dams' manager (Army Corps of Engineers) maintains aggressive water release policies. See Stacy
Shelton, Georgia's Water Crisis: Wasteful Habits Wither in Drought, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 6, 2008,
avaiabkathttp://www.ajc.com/metro/content/printedition/2008/04/06/drught4O6.hm (noting
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Yet, land and water have no monopoly on fuzzy ownership boundaries. Many
other perplexing boundary controversies may also be found beyond prima facie
obvious property rights. A sampling includes found property, inherited assets,
archaeological tribal relics, access to clean air or direct sun, radio frequency use,
and domains of outer space.6
Such murkiness could not satisfy the crisp standards by which Bessen and
Meurer measure whether something truly works as property in their new book,
PatentFailure.7 Under their primary theory, "if you can't tell the boundaries, it ain't
property," i.e., a failure to notice or recognize boundaries is evidence of failure in
that water levels were more than thirteen feet below normal); Stacy Shelton, Coips of Engineers Will Cut
Water Releases from Lanier Reduction Won't Be AS Much as Georgia Requested, ATLANTA J.-CONST.
(Mar. 13,2008), availabkathttp://www.ac.com/metro/content/metro/stories/2008/03/13/corps-
0314.html (reporting the Corps' decision to cut water flow past Atlanta from Lake Lanier by 64.6
million gallons a day, only half of the twenty-five percent reduction requested by Georgia
Environmental Protection Division Director Carol Couch).
6 Examples of controversies over ambiguous boundaries for property rights include the
following: Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 21 L.J.R. 75 (Q.B. 1851) (holding that lost property goes to the
finder rather than the owner of the premises); McAvoy v. Medina, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 548 (1866)
(holding that the finder takes nothing and mislaid property belongs to the owner of the premises
until the true owner claims it, though the distinction between lost and mislaid requires a court to
know something about the one who lost the item); Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (holding that Doctrine of Worthier Title inheritance raises a presumption that no
remainder is granted, but the presumption is rebuttable by evidence of a contrary intent of the
grantor); Whitacre v. State, 619 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), affd, 629 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. 1994)
(holding that a man who wished to dig for Native American artifacts was required to obtain a state
permit under Indiana's Historic Preservation and Archeology Act though the dig was on his own
property); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 26 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that
the question of whether carbon emissions in air constitutes a nuisance involves non-justiciable
political questions that are consigned to the political branches, not the judiciary); Comer v. Murphy
Oil, USA, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-436 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007), appeal docketed, No. 07-60756 (5th
Cir. 2007) (dismissing greenhouse gas emission nuisance lawsuit on both political question grounds
and for lack of standing); Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114
So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (holding that blocking sunlight was not a nuisance); Prah v.
Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982) (holding that there is a cause of action from blocking sunlight);
FCC v. Nextwave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003) (holding that use licenses for
federal radio frequency properties are like other property licenses and thus are governed by
bankruptcy law); Wayne N. White, Jr., Real Property Rights in Outer Space, PROCEEDINGS, 40TH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 370 (IISL 1998), availabk athttp://www.spacefuture.
com/archive/real-property rightsin_outerspace.shtml ('The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits
states from establishing territorial sovereignty, but authorizes and, in some cases even requires, that
states exercise jurisdiction over space objects and personnel .... The 1967 Outer Space Treaty [1]
does not provide a positive regime for the governance of space development. The 1979 Moon
Treaty [2] provides a regime for development, but that regime prohibits real property rights. For
that and other reasons, most nations have not signed or ratified the Moon Treaty.").
' JAMES BESSEN & MICHAELJ. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOWJUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008).
[Vol. 16:1
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public policy and legal instruments.8 Thus their standard for certainty in
intellectual property exceeds what is practical even for many venerable types of
tangible property, and their call to disqualify many patents as property seems to
be misdirected, or at least needs a more technically correct basis.
Nevertheless I believe Bessen and Meurer make an important policy
contribution to patent law reform both by drawing attention to the problem of
inadvertent infringers and in consolidating a prodigious amount of economic data
on patents.9 Infringement is, of course, like trespass, with strict liability in most
cases.' ° Even when a patent right is obscure and an infringer tried in advance to
avoid infringement, her mental state is not relevant and the law holds her liable.
Yet, in this situation, society has an interest in reducing liability costs.
Consequently, the authors focus on parties blind-sided by infringement suits.
Though Bessen and Meurer confined their analysis to the needs of inadvertent
infringers, I would broaden the scope to include first inventors' needs because
infringement penalties are important for protection from unfair trade practices.
Finding effective ways to minimize infringement costs simultaneously for both
the original and the later independent inventor is a more challenging, yet
promising, goal than reducing costs for either in isolation. Any politically
expedient solution must accommodate both types of inventors. Moreover, one-
sided reforms have unintended consequences."
In this Article, I introduce a trio of plumb lines for reforming the notice
function, at a low cost to original inventors and the patent office, to minimize
inadvertent infringement by diligent parties acting in good faith. My model aligns
the scope of enforceability with United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) examiners' perceptions of inventions, as gauged by existing art
classifications. It also aligns the scope of anticipation with inventor perceptions
at the time of filing by requiring inventors to search and discuss nearest known
art; this strengthens estoppel prospects for claim scope. My model aligns the
8 Id. at 8.
9 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 46-72 (arguing that inadvertent infringement arises
in many cases due to vagueness and ambiguity in patent claims, hiding of claims in continuation
patents, and/or the large number of patents that must be searched).
1o See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000 & Supp. 2003) (providing that an infringer's intent is irrelevant).
But see 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000) (providing an exception for an unmarked patented or patent-
pending invention where the infringer received no actual notice); see also 35 U.S.C. 5 223 (2000)
(providing the earlier-inventor defense for business method infringement).
" See Robert K Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences ofPurposive SodalAcion, 1 AM. SOCIOL.
REV. 894 (1936) (introducing the concept of the law of unintended consequences, also called the law
of unforseen consequences); California State University, Museum of unintended consequences,
http://cs.calstatela.edu/wild/index.php/Courses/CS-461/Museum-of-unintended-consequences
(last visited Oct. 8, 2008) (providing a brief introduction and numerous examples of purposive
actions that led to unintended consequences).
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scope of obviousness with market (not just technical) consensus by articulating
an inevitability criterion that fills gaps recognized by KSR rules.12 Then, to assess
whether more extensive change is needed, I test the economic and jurisprudential
assumptions that underly the urgency of Bessen and Meurer's arguments and the
magnitude of their advocated reform. I find that contravening factors undermine
their assumptions and require alternative interpretations of their data, justifying
restraint in patent reform.
II. PLUMB LINE No. 1: ALIGN ENFORCEABILITY WITH INVENTION
CATEGORIES
I begin with the proposition that the issuing examiner's understanding of an
invention during original prosecution is an objective basis for limiting the
applicable patent's scope of enforcement. In part, the notice function is provided
by cataloged categories of art that the examiner searched. These are
unambiguous; the public is on notice of them because they are codified on the
face of the patent. This also informs prosecution history estoppel because search
classes can be contested during prosecution and supplemental filings may be
made for claims under other art class categories.13
This is an alternative to Bessen and Meurer's proposal to eliminate generic or
abstract language, 4 which I think is unworkable for the following reasons. Patent
applicants walk a fine line between stating limits on their invention's scope under
12 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
" Arguably an applicant's privilege to influence classification decisions both at filing and during
prosecution is implicit in the PTO's rules and procedures, even though it is not discussed much per
se in PTO official documents. Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.76(b)(3) (2008), the Application Data Sheet
(ADS), which is voluntary for both provisional and nonprovisional patent applications, includes
sections in which the applicant may at her option suggest the classification class(es) and subclass(es),
and technology unit for the assignment. See Form SB14 EFS-WEB (2007), availabk athttp://www.
uspto.gov/web/forms/index.html#startforms. Also, during the prosecution itself, the grounds for
rebutting examiner rejections of claims are not expressly limited to those in which art search
classifications must remain the same, thus the relevance of classifications is intrinsically at issue
during prosecution. See, e.g., UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE § 2100 [hereinafter MPEP] ("Patentability" generally). For a
particular example, see § 2141.01(a) (discussing the judicial rule that PTO classification is some
evidence of analogy for purposes of rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103, but similarities and differences
in structure and function carry more weight than the manner in which the invention was [originally]
classified). Section 904 further provides for both updating of a search and further searches after the
first action on the merits of an application. Thus, applicants already influence classifications and can
challenge them at least to the extent that overcoming a rejection requires doing so. Expanding this
right and making it statutory would put applicants into a position where their failure to challenge the
scope of classification could be used to estop their enforcement outside that scope.
14 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at pp. 56-62 (criticizing vague patent claim language).
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the notice requirement and trying to draft claims that retain first-mover fair trade
advantages by preempting copycats, improvers (whose patents may block key
improvements of the original), and workaround technicians who might never
develop the invention on their own otherwise. If the doctrine of equivalents
provided much broader protection, then in theory drafting could be reduced to
a description of one important embodiment of the invention because a broader
umbra of embodiments would be implicit as equivalents, but United States
patents are not interpreted by "central claiming."' 5 The only viable alternative is
abstraction-broad descriptions and not just particular examples--otherwise
applicants would list every variation in concrete terms and excruciating, expensive
detail, 6 or file for many patents.
A classroom exercise illustrates the problem. Even my patent law students
who have engineering backgrounds struggle when trying to draft clear, concise,
inclusive, anticipatory but not overinclusive or underinclusive claims for
something as simple as a pair of scissors. The blades are at certain relative
orientations; their abutting surfaces slide in juxtaposition when cutting; and the
rotation about a fused or freely moving pivot piece must be described. And that
is for a device with only three moving parts (or just two if the pivot piece is fused
to a blade, and just one if the pivot piece is flexible and fused to both blades).
Thus, it was not hyperbole or polite deference when the Supreme Court described
patent applications as "one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with
accuracy.,
17
Moreover, the blades can be straight, zigzagged (as in pinking shears), or
another shape; may be coated with a lubricant or other chemical; may be spring-
loaded and may be of any size; and the handles may have optional shapes. The
pivot piece may straddle the scissors to connect only the outside faces of the
blades. Also, scissors may be metal, plastic or ceramic; they may be pre-heated
or pre-chilled for use; and their sliding surfaces may be planar, bent or curved.
Blade sharpness may vary; blades must also be cinched neither too tightly nor too
loosely; and cutting may be near the pivot point, the blades' far end, or anywhere
in between. Scissors may be customized to cut paper, cloth, films, plastic mesh,
Is The United States patent system has a "peripheral" claiming system. That is, claims mark the
outer boundaries of the technology considered proprietary to the patentee. Exparte Fressoa, 27
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1608 (B.P.A.I. 1993). For a discussion of the earlier U.S. approach and the
transition to peripheral claiming, see ROBERT C. KAHRL, PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 2-41 to 2-49
(2001).
16 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(s) (2008) (discouraging long applications by charging a $260.00 fee, or
$130.00 for a small entity, for every fifty pages over one hundred per fee transmittal form
PTO/SB/17).
"7 Sperry v. Florida exreL Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963) (quoting Topliffv. Topliff, 145
U.S. 156, 171 (1892)).
7
Denton: Plumb Lines Instead of a Wrecking Ball: A Model for Recalibrating
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2008
J. INTELL PROP. L[o
rubber foams, metal sheets, hair, hedges, fingernails or other items. One blade
may optionally be shorter, thicker, wider, or sharper than the other; one blade may
be held stationary (as at a workbench clamp); the scissors may be configured for
non-manual use (e.g., avoiding a robotics workaround); and so forth. So some
scope may be prophetic. Only abstraction is efficient: "Two oppositely oriented
cutting bodies held movably in close proximity to one another."
Of course, patents cannot be obtained on the purest abstraction (scientific
principle), and claims must be more peripheral than central.' For instance, more
than an invention's essence must be claimed to satisfy the definiteness criteria. 9
Nevertheless, analysis of an invention's abstract central "essence" is alive and well
because PTO search parameters are guided by the examiner's central understanding
of the invention instead of identifying and searching art from every classification
at its periphery.
For that reason, instead of eliminating abstract language-which could be
something as ordinary as "central processing unit (CPU)," a common term in
software and computer patents-it would be more effective to simply ascertain
what the examiner understood the invention to be. In principle, that was the
basis for the grant anyway. Bessen and Meurer anticipate that logic and propose
that the PTO should be authorized to provide opinion letters on infringement
after issuance, 0 which as described is reminiscent of reexamination for validity.2'
At first blush this solution is attractive because it amplifies the technical expertise
and databases for addressing the problem. Yet PTO opinion letters may be no
improvement. The PTO imposes severe time constraints on all forms of
22examination, 2 and, at least in private practice, opinion letters are very time
consuming. Also, the PTO would not likely have the full slate of evidence before
it renders an opinion on infringement, otherwise opinion costs would rival
s MPEP, supra note 13, § 2106(JV)(C).
9 See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 159 (1852) (declaring that, "a principle is not patentable.
A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be
patented. ... '). For a fuller discussion of the United States transition from describing an invention
by its operating principle (central claiming in the patent application) to peripheral (i.e., "metes and
bounds") claiming beginning in the 1870s, see KAHRL, supra note 15.
20 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 241-42.
2 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307, 311-318 (addressing reexamination).
z See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1496 n.3
(2001) ("Examiners have astonishingly little time to spend on each application-on average, a total
of 18 hours, including the time spent reading the application, reading the submitted prior art,
searching for and reading prior art in databases accessible to the PTO, comparing that prior art to
the application, writing an office action, reading and responding to the response to office action,
iterating the last two steps at least one and often more times, conducting an interview with the
applicant, and ensuring that the diagrams and claims are in form for allowance.'); see also BESSEN &
MEURER, supra note 7, at 56 (discussing the hourly constraints).
[Vol. 16:1
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litigation costs. Because the PTO already had ample opportunity to build a
delimiting file history, and because issued patents are regularly invalidated by
courts, a completely independent review by the courts is more appropriate. For
a difficult case, a district court would be better advised to retain a special master.
Fortunately, there is a simpler way to plumb the PTO's understanding of an
invention's nature or essence. The cover pages of U.S. and foreign patents list a
series of classification codes that designate the specific fields of prior art that were
searched when examining the application, and which can be searched by any
party.2" The PTO's search results are also displayed at its online public database
for file histories.2" The U.S. patent application data sheet specifically requests
suggestions from applicants as to which classifications should be searched and
which group art unit should do the examination, though making such a
recommendation is not mandatory.2" In the event that a PTO search is narrower
than an applicant desires, she is free to file additional applications. These may be
divisional if an examiner has issued a restriction requirement after determining
that the subject matter under review would involve too many classification
codes.26 The applicant may also file continuation or continuation-in-part
applications with amended claims to obtain searches under alternate classification
codes.27
The examined code series are not exclusive, yet they identify the patent office's
essential understanding of the nature of the invention with at least implicit
acquiescence by the applicant as to their relevance where she does not object in
the record.28 These art categories are in fact specifically screened by some patent
I See PTO, USPTO, Patent Full-Text and Image Database: Advanced Search, http://patft.us
pto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2008) (reclassifying some older PTO
codes); PTO, USPTO, Patent Full-Text and Image Database: Patent Number Search, http://patft.
uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm (last visited Oct. 8,2008) (listing current art codes); MPEP,
supra note 13, § 900 ("Prior Art, Classification, Search.").
24 The entry web page for publicly available PAIR files is at http://portal.uspto.gov/extemal/
portal/pair (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
25 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.76(b)(3) (2008) (stipulating contents of application data sheet); see, e.g., Form
SB14 EFS-WEB (2007), availabk at http://www.uspto.gov/web/forms/index.html#startforms.
26 See MPEP, supra note 13, § 803 ("If the search and examination of an entire application can
be made without serious burden, the examiner must examine it on the merits, even though it
includes claims to independent or distinct inventions .... There are two criteria for a proper
requirement for restriction between patentably distinct inventions: (A) The inventions must be
independent.., or distinct as claimed... and (B) There must be a serious burden on the examiner
if restriction is required . . . .'), 201.06 (concerning the filing of divisional applications for
independent or distinct inventions carved out of a pending application).
7 Regarding continuation and continuation-in-part applications generally, see id % 201.07,201.08,
respectively. Regarding classification codes, an alternative code can be suggested at filing of the
continuation or CIP as permitted under 37 C.F.Rt § 1.76(b)(3) (2008).
' An inventor's view of the scope and heart of the invention is typically stated in the "field of
9
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practitioners (myself included) when rendering legal opinions on validity,
clearance, and infringement. Searches by classification are also a standard feature
of commercial patent database vendors. My proposal here is for courts to
consider the relatedness of classification codes between those searched by the
original examiner and those in which infringement allegedly occurs. The beauty
of such an analysis is that verbal interpretation is not required. The analysis
merely reviews which fields PTO examiners thought were most pertinent at the
time. The codes represent a valuable, objective, and neutral indicator of what
scope of art is reasonably searchable for a given invention-which is also a good
proxy for the degree of infringer willfulness-and they require no drastic change
in current patent practice. A patentee whose enforcement of invention breadth
is distant from searched art classes could lose on at least one of the following
three grounds: (a) the distant art was not searched or in view by the examiner
thus it was irrelevant and not at issue; (b) the wider significance of the disclosure
would have been lost on a person of ordinary skill in the art that was searched,
thus it was not enabled; or (c) failure to seek the relevant art search during
prosecution disqualified enforcement for that utility due to prosecution laches.29
Thus, with respect to alleged infringement, fairness would require a broad
interpretation of issued patent claims within the arts coded on the face of the
patent, but a narrow interpretation within arts that are distant from or non-
obvious over those codes. Under this approach an invention relating to point-of-
sale retail hardware or processes might be considered relatively distant from
online ordering algorithms, and vice versa, unless the prosecution record had
specifically touched upon the potential overlap of obviousness between them.
This type of analysis will defang any mindful hiding of invention utility in unusual
claim terms," because they cannot unveil a broader scope of interpretation after
the invention" and "brief description of the invention" sections, but they are less rigorously defined
than PTO numerical categories. See MPEP, supra note 13, § 608.01 (c) (field of invention), 608.01 (d)
(brief summary of invention).
29 See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., LP (Symbol l), 422
F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (resurrecting the prosecution laches doctrine, the torpedo that spelled the
end of the true submarine patents).
30 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 194-201 (describing cases and the use of certain
categories of daim terms as hiding the invention utility). In particular, see page 200, where they
object to the use of abstract terms such as "frame" and "matching" because in some cases the
progress of technology renders the claim map increasingly uncertain over time. They likewise argue
that certain terms are too vague to describe software inventions, including the terms "point of sale
location," "material object," and "information manufacturing machine" to describe a software
invention as for U.S. Patent No. 4,528,643. The authors observe that, "[a]lthough clever lawyers can
use vague language with any technology, abstract technologies particularly lend themselves to such
abuses because they are inherently described in abstract terms." Bessen and Meurer are also
concerned that such terms can be chosen rationally such that they will receive a narrow interpretation
10
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issue. This limiting analysis addresses the problem cited in Bessen and Meurer's
primary example of ill-advised litigation holdings. 1 The solution offered here also
avoids the very difficult task of refining claim interpretation rules. Curiously,
though art turned up by PTO searches is often at issue in patent cases, the search
scope has been overlooked in claim interpretation. 2
Many classification codes are narrow, and due to time constraints each
examiner searches only a few categories even if more might be relevant.33 Thus
in some respects, the aggregate scope of the codes may still be less than the utility
of the invention. Also, the issued patent will pertain to all of the relevant
comparable uses, even in related code fields that the examiner did not search. So
the value of the codes is not as a boundary, but as a metric to gauge whether a
claimed utility is far removed from the utility basis for which the invention was
awarded. There is a public interest in the award and enforcement of patents for
the scope of invention as reasonably disclosed to the patent office, and reasonably
understood and representatively searched by the patent office. The assertion of
patent claims for anything broader threatens this interest.
This branch of my plumb line addresses Bessen and Meurer's finding that
"about a quarter of all lawsuits between public firms involved firms that patented
in very different technology classes andwhich were in unrelated industries."'  By
way of illustration of my basic classification search, consider the Freeny E-data
patent cited by Bessen and Meurer as an instance of blocking on-line sales
inappropriately.35 The relevant classification codes changed after being stated on
the face of the patent, but are shown with updated code numbers at the PTO's
online full-text database. 6 Here the updated chief class is 705/52. The title of
by a patent examiner, but may success fully be enforced under a broader interpretation of the terms.
This latter concern, however, ignores the rule that during prosecution pending claims must be given
the broadest reasonable interpretation that is consistent with the specification. See MPEP, supra
note 13, § 2111 ("Claim Interpretation; Broadest Reasonable Interpretation.'), 2173.05(a) ("Claims
Must Particularly Point Out and Distinctly Claim the Invention.").
31 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 69-70 (discussing suits against Amazon by firms
holding patents covering cable TV movie selection and bank ATM interface).
32 For instance, in a full reading of all chemical, pharmaceutical and biotechnology patent
opinions by the Federal Circuit betweenJanuary 2003 and mid-2005, there did not appear to be even
one instance in which the court mentioned PTO search classification categories when determining
the claim scope or deciding the case. F. Russell Denton, Untitled (2008) (unpublished research, on
file with the author).
33 See Lemley, spra note 22 ("Examiners have astonishingly little time to spend on each
application-on average, a total of eighteen hours .... ").
3 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 69.
31 Id. at 194 (discussing U.S. Patent No. 4,528,643 (filed Jan. 10, 1983)).
3 PTO, USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database Advanced Search, http://patft.uspto.
gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
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the 705 class is "Data Processing- Financial, Business Practice, Management, or
Cost/Price Determination."37 Subclass 52 is part of a nested series of subordinate
classes as follows: (50) "Business Processing Using Cryptography" (defined to
include "the processing of financial data or where a charge for goods or services
is determined"; (51) "Usage Protection of Distributed Data Files" (defined to
include "usage of distributed information representing a selection by an
individual... controlled by encryption," with a note indicating that the method
of distribution can include downloading); (52) "Usage or Charge Determination"
(defined to include "determining the amount of use of the selected information
or a cost associated therewith").
A historical study of the classification categories would likely find their content
was not so well defined or clearly articulated when the Freeny application was
filed in 1983, which constrains the hindsight value of updated codes.3" But for a
rational search today by art classes, the current categories give ample notice.
Moreover, three other U.S. class/subclass categories currently apply to this patent,
as do six international codes.3 9 So, for a code search today, there would be no
question that if this patent was newly issued it is highly relevant to electronic
commerce. The text may also be searched electronically,' e.g., a quick e-search
of the text and a review of the PDF drawings reveals the Freeny patent does not
mention kiosks by that name, though Bessen and Meurer use that term in their
description of its coverage.4
" PTO, Classification Definitions, availabk at http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classifica
tion/uspc705/sched7O5.pdf (citing subclasses of (5Z) including- (72) through (79) which cover a
general electronic commerce system which includes billing; (380) which covers cryptography; and
subclasses of (380) such as (231) through (234) which classify video electric signal modification using
cryptography having usage or charge determination). Definitions for any class can be searched at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
38 See Albert J. Dalhuisen, Patenting Computer Programs: Pragmatic Aspects, SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 503, 515 (1993) (describing the evolution of PTO "computer
program" classification).
31 U.S. Patent No. 4,528,643 (filed Jan. 10, 1983).
4 See PTO, PTO, Patent Full-Text and Image Database: Patent Number Search, http://patft.
uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/srchnum.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
4t See, e.g., the E-Data application discussed at BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 194-95. The
text, but not the drawings, of the patent are readily searchable at the Patent Full-Text and Image
Database, supra note 40. The reader may download free PDF images of the patent at http://
www.pat2pdf.org (last visited Oct. 8,2008) (preferred over the PTO website, which downloads only
one PDF page per command). The interested reader may visually review graphics in pdf files of
United States patent documents.
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III. PLUMB LINE NO. 2: ALIGN SCOPE WITH INITIAL
INVENTOR PERCEPTIONS
As discussed above, my proposed filters for examiner perceptions are
enhanced. I would also enhance them for the applicant's perceptions. With one
modest change in prosecution protocol, an applicant's understanding of the
invention during original prosecution can be ascertained from the record much
more objectively to limit its scope of enforcement. This concerns the applicant's
disclosure and characterization of prior art, which is already a routine aspect in
patent prosecution.
Applicants are not required to conduct a search of prior art, but until the
application becomes abandoned, they must in candor and good faith inform the
PTO of all information known to be material (i.e., unfavorable) to patentability,
of which the inventor, attorney, or agent, and any other person associated with
the filing and prosecution are aware.42 Information that is cumulative (i.e.,
redundant) in materiality relative to other information need not be disclosed.43
The art disclosures by the applicant are filed using a standard PTO form and
typically include citations and hard copies (cited U.S. patent documents need no
hard copies) of the art.' Sources for the art include foreign office actions for the
same invention, U.S. and foreign office actions for sibling applications, citations
to other members of the patent family, art known to the inventor, and art found
during due diligence searches.4" Disclosing hundreds of references or rendering
biased translations is viewed as possible inequitable conduct to bury material
information among less important information.' Usually applicants are not
required to compare or contrast this art with their own claims. But applicants
requesting accelerated examination must search for prior art, identify all claimed
elements found in each relevant reference, and prepare an explanation of why the
claims are patentable over the references.47
42 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2008); see also MPEP, supra note 13, § 2001.04 (discussing information
requirements).
43 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2008); see also MPEP, supra note 13, § 2001.05 (discussing cumulative
information).
4" See Form PTO/SB/08a,b (PTO-1449) (2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/for
ms/index.html (Information Disclosure Statement by Applicant Form); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.97
(2008) (filing of information disclosure statement); id. § 1.98 (content of information disclosure
statement, including citation and hard copy requirements).
MPEP, supra note 13, § 2001.06.
4 See eSpeed, Inc. v. Brokertec USA, L.L.C., 480 F.3d 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (pertaining
to voluminous exhibits); Semiconductor Energy Lab Co. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 204
F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (pertaining to a partially translated reference).
41 MPEP, supra note 13, § 708.02. Until Aug. 25, 2006 accelerated examination was available
only in certain special cases, but since then it has also accommodated any applicant willing to meet
13
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Because comments during prosecution on third-party art could be construed
in subsequent litigation (aptly or not) either as a narrowing admission or unethical
misrepresentation,48 patent practitioners are loathe to make them except in
response to office actions to rebut specific grounds of rejection. Moreover
practitioners will not undertake searches without specific instructions from the
client. Yet requiring each utility patent applicant to timely and systematically
search and discuss prior art as well as search criteria closest to their independent
claim limitations would better establish the applicant's mindful scope of relevance
and create estoppel grounds. A search need not be costly or exhaustive-merely
representative of scope. A foreseeable side benefit would be that an applicant's
submitted search and discussion of the closest prior art could help anticipate and
avoid common rejections because the issues of knowledge, obviousness and
enablement for persons of ordinary skill in the relative art would be addressed in
the submitted remarks. 49
Frankly, patent attorneys do not need or want the extra work this proposal
contemplates because they already have a full docket and a backlog. Yet the cost
to applicants would not be high. Bessen and Meurer's cited cost of $5,000 to
search software art" is probably an underestimate for clearance purposes and an
overestimate for prior art disclosure purposes, but is a modest fraction relative to
the total costs of patent drafting, prosecution and maintenance."'
the new search and discussion requirements. See PTO, Automated Examination (Aug. 25, 2006),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/accelerated/.
4 See Festo Corp. v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (discussing
estoppel); 37 C.F.IL § 1.56 (2008) (discussing inequitable conduct and explaining that the patent
applicant has a duty of candor and good faith to the PTO); id. § 10.23,10.85 (2008) (explaining that
a practitioner violates PTO standards of conduct if she participates in a material way in the giving
of false or misleading information to the PTO or any of its employees. Note that breach of the duty
of candor and good faith may include misstatements of fact, including misstatements in affidavits
concerning patentability); see also eSpeed, Inc., 480 F.3d at 1138 (explaining that "[a]n inference of
intent may arise where material false statements are proferred in a declaration or other sworn
statement submitted to the PTO .... The district court was free to draw an inference that these
declarations were 'the chosen instrument of an intentional scheme to deceive the PTO'... because
'the affirmative act of submitting an affidavit must be construed as being intended to be relied
upon.' ".
9 Applicants following best practices have little to lose from it. The specifications they file
already describe inventions in considerable detail with a fill menu of detailed definitions and
examples. Moreover, their attorneys do not try to sneak something past examiners because unethical
behavior would jeopardize their license at the PTO. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 10.85(a)(2), (3) (2008)
(explaining practitioner duties of good faith and disclosure). Thus, they do not rely on vagueness
to capture scope.
-o BEssEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 213, and references cited therein.
" See Lemley, supra note 22, at 1498-99 (reviewing prosecution cost estimates as ranging from
$10,000 to $30,000 per patent).
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To date, the primary objective in requiring applicant disclosure of material
information has been to facilitate examination and prevent hiding of potentially
invalidating art, but disclosure has far wider potential. Like the classification
codes, such disclosures can be a safety valve to estop outrageous expansion of
claim scope. For instance in the point-of-sale Freeny patent cited by Bessen and
Meurer, 2 the discussion of background art largely addressed vending machines. 3
If the applicant had been required to search and comment on the closest (in the
applicant's mind) known relevant art, and only items pertaining to vending
machines were submitted in response, it would suggest that other types of sales
including (ultimately) online sales were never in view. In such a case the inventor
would never have been in possession of the wider scope.
In other words, an inventor's demarcation of an application's circle of
relevance should also impose limits on claim interpretation and on scope under
the doctrine of equivalents. Designation of relevance in prior art can indicate by
concrete example what written description has often failed to do. It can also
prevent vague or "lucky" patentees from usurping scope beyond what was in their
mental possession on the filing date. Thus, I propose that inventors should be
required to list examples of nearest prior art. This is somewhat like Bessen and
Meurer's suggestion of including claim charts in the prosecution history,54 and
coincidentally supports their objective of limiting early stage development from
claiming later-stage technologies,55 except that in my model the claim charts would
be initiated by the applicant, not the examiner. The PTO is loathe to add new
tedious tasks to examiner caseloads in any case.
It would further strengthen the record if examiners were required to annotate
the forms for an applicant's art submissions where the relevance was not
supported by the application. Specific grounds should be cited for determinations
of irrelevance, such as that the cited relevance lacks an enabling basis in the
application, or the application is too ambiguous to support a finding of relevance.
Currently, examiners merely initial each citation on a submitted art disclosure
form and enter it into the record to confirm that the art has been reviewed for
relevance to validity.56 Indications of irrelevance during original prosecution
would have more value than ex post facto PTO findings because they would raise
a red flag at a time when an applicant could be estopped by acquiescence.
s2 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 194-95.
" U.S. Patent No. 4,528,643, cols. 1-4 (filed Jan. 10, 1983).
54 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 240-41.
s Id. at 243.
See MPEP, supra note 13, § 609 (discussing examiner initialing of information disclosure
statements to indicate that references therein have been considered).
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To be most effective, in a full, dear, concise and exact way (i.e., the standard
for definiteness), the applicant's disclosure and characterization should explain
how limitations of the independent claims are like and unlike the closest
embodiments in the respective reference.5 7 The characterization should also
reference page and line numbers in the specification as well as the cited art that
support any interpretation of claim limitations that is not prima facie obvious
from the claim terms standing in isolation. Prolix and disorganized discussion
should be barred.
This requirement would have a low administrative burden. The PTO already
reviews art disclosure forms routinely and values characterizations by applicants
as a means for expediting examination."5 And, the courts already rely on the
evidentiary and estoppel value of a well-developed prosecution history.5 9
IV. PLUMB LINE No. 3: ALIGN OBVIOUSNESS WITH MARKET PERCEPTIONS
Having identified perception gauges for examiners and inventors, let us turn
to market perceptions. My third proposition is that original inventors should be
on notice that an innovation may be in the public domain (i.e., through
obviousness) when markets have been moving inexorably toward development
of the invention. In other words, the invention is inevitable. I identify four
elements that must be present in substantial measure to justify a finding of
inevitability: market convergence, limited alternatives, predictable art, and
common knowledge.
A. MARKET CONVERGENCE
Regarding market convergence, an extreme case is when asserted infringement
claims from a single patent block many companies from strategies they planned
at about the same time as the original invention. This happens in winner-take-all
technology "horse races" in which the independent inventions differ in time only
by days or even hours.6 ° The effect is the same as when a submarine patent
emerges in an established market. Each player must decide whether to license,
7 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 2 (2000) (specification).
18 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 (2008) (content of information disclosure statement).
'9 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (defining
the elements of prosecution history estoppels).
60 See, e.g., Eliot Marshall, AIDS Researrb: HII Experts vs. Sequencers in Patent Race, 275 SCI. 1263
(1997). Half a dozen HIV groups were vying for priority on CCR--the receptor by which HIV
enters cells early in an infection-and many filed patent applications. However, Human Genome
Sciences, a genetics company not directly involved in these HIV studies-beat them to the patent
office. Id.
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litigate, or leave the field. The only reason so many companies could get caught
in the horse race dilemma is by all pursuing the same general solution. So, a
cogent review should consider whether an original inventor presciently anticipated
or influenced the market direction well before all others (so the invention was not
yet inevitable), or simply ran with the pack on a well-defined track and led by a
nose at the finish line (i.e., invention was inevitable).
The policy rationale for a market convergence element assumes that inevitable
movements by free markets need no federal patent incentives. When many
companies crowd into the same market space at the same time, it suggests prices
should fall naturally to commodity levels. A patent will only distort the market
by enabling a price premium for an innovation in which competitors required no
premium. Of course, United States courts have not expressly recognized
inevitability as a basis to reject or invalidate claims, but the principle can also be
stated in obviousness terms. When an entire market moves together, the frontier
of obviousness to one of ordinary skill in the relevant art moves in the same
direction at the same rate. The patentable scope collapses as the point of interest
is neared, thus the winner of a technology race should not necessarily receive a
patent. But trend analysis must not be too fatalistic, otherwise nothing would be
patentable.
Crowdedness is a key concept here. A market with two players is usually not
a crowd. Three is likely not a crowd. But six players could be a crowd. And
twenty competitors in the same market-that would definitely be a crowd for a
market environment. If they all move in a certain direction, something must be
obvious.
B. PREDICTABLE ART
The second element, predictable art, affects some fields more than others. In
particular, the development of software, mechanical devices, and electrical circuits
has highly predictable features, mechanisms, and paradigms,6' though sub-field
exceptions exist,62 and even predictable fields are not immune to gremlins such
as software bugs or electrical circuit cross-talk. Conversely, even normally
unpredictable fields, such as complex biotechnology, have pockets of
predictability. For instance, an expectedly patentable pure natural extract may
61 Telephone Interview with Dr. Allen L. Brown, Jr., Software Architect/Senior Program
Manager, Web Data Access Group, Microsoft Corp. (Nov. 2006) (indicating that effective software
designs can be predicted in advance of software patents).
6 For example, flat panel antennas have complex behavior. Interviews with Dr. Oscar Garay
and staff, Motorola, Inc., Radio Products Division, in Plantation, Fla. (1993-1995). In the 1990s
Motorola's Ph.D. engineers felt only empirical data could establish their exact properties. Id.
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have predictable utility and predictably effective purification paths. Technical
predictability can be a liability. Many companies cannot justify the expense of
commercially attractive inventions unless managers anticipate reaping premium
profit levels by locking out copy artists. But in uncrowded fields, even for
predictable arts, such patents would be justifiable in policy.
An example of unpredictable results at the time of invention is DNA
sequencing. When its first commercially viable chemistry was invented, there
were probably twenty undiscovered alternative chemistries that potentially could
have been used instead if someone had taken the effort to find them. Yet the
first-to-market advantage would have been so significant, and the "also-ran"
development and discovery effort would have been so burdensome, that it would
not have been worth the effort to invent around the first discoverer of an
economically viable method.63 And there would be no plausible argument that
competitors could reach the same invention the same way or the same day, so
most players would just license or move on.
Note that a benefit of the predictability element is that it allows fair and
impartial discrimination according to the patent needs of industries without
requiring an industry-specific rule. Yet, it does not foreclose patents altogether
for creative approaches or market creation in an industry that is built on a highly
predictable art. It does not penalize patentees either in less predictable art or in
spaces where art is uncrowded. Rectification of software patents is a special
concern to Bessen and Meurer (one of whom has run a software company).64 If
I understand their proposals, they would not only broaden obviousness criteria,65
but even eliminate software patents as a class because of inherent abstractness
(i.e., indefiniteness) and unknowing equivalence.66 So only unpredictable arts
would retain substantial patent scope. My proposal merely aims to make the least
amount of change that will remove the problem.
C. LIMITED ALTERNATIVES
The third element, limited alternatives, may apply to the product, the service
design, the available resources, or any combination of the three.6' For a design
" Except, perhaps, for a second-place player who was finishing non-identical development
efforts when the winner emerged.
6 James Bessen & MichaelJ. Meurer, Presentation at the University of Georgia School of Law
Symposium: James Bessen and MichaelJ. Meurer's Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and
Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk (Mar. 29, 2008).
65 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 248.
Id at 203.
67 See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (addressing limited alternatives;
there are only so many ways to locate sensors on a brake pedal).
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example, there are only so many ways to click through a website. Amazon's
patented one-click purchase process6" is an extreme example of tying up one of
the seemingly few alternatives available in a field, though in that particular case the
hindrance to the rest of the industry has likely been exaggerated.69 A more severe
example of industry constraint is found in Bessen and Meurer's discussion of the
submarine-like effects from the Freeney patent.7v For a resource example, there
are a limited number of botanical sources known to be rich in the antioxidant
resveratrol 7v If the nutraceutical industry moves en masse to make resveratrol
dietary supplements, those supplements based on ground seeds from muscadines
(leathery skinned wild grapes common in the southeastern United States) should
not necessarily be patentable over ground components of domestic grapes if the
industry rushes toward both. In general, when technology races converge toward
one or two solutions, players likely have few alternatives that can serve the desired
purpose.
6' U.S. Patent No. 6,525,747 (filed Aug. 2, 1999).
69 The Internet industry was particularly irate over the one-click patent, which seemed to
epitomize their grievances about business method patents in general. See, e.g., Matthew G. Wells,
Internet Business Method Patent Poigy, 87 VA. L. REv. 729 (2001). The vaunted advantage was that the
Amazon customer does not need to re-enter data for shipping and orders. But on reflection, the
patent probably did not inconvenience competitors much. For instance, on a physical level it is not
difficult to click twice instead of once, and who counts clicks anyhow? Moreover, Amazon asserted
its patent publicly only against Barnes and Noble, with whom it ultimately settled. See Troy
Wolverton, Amazon, Barnes&Noble settle patent suit, CNET NEWS, Mar. 6,2002, http://news.com.
com/2100-1017-854105.html (reporting settlement). Currently the patent's validity is uncertain,
because it is under reexamination due to a third-party request. U.S. Patent App. No. 90/007,946
(filed Feb. 16,2006). However, it seems likely that the real value of the patent was less in excluding
competitors or obtaining licensing fees, than in creating a trademark-like advantage. For instance
one Amazon web page uses the term "1-Click" no less than 14 times in a section with 101 words.
Amazon, Ordering via 1-Click, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeI
d=468480 (last visited Oct. 7,2008). From that marketing-based perspective, we might surmise that
the controversy over the single click only played into Amazon's hands by providing free publicity
and enhancing recognition of its brand name among consumers.
70 BESsEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 194.
71 RESVERATROL iN HEALTH AND DISEASE (Bharat B. Aggarwal & Shishir Shishodia
eds., 2006). Resveratrol (3,5,4'-trihydroxystilbene), also called sirtun, is a polyphenolic phytoalexin
that has antioxidant properties and is produced naturally in several fruits and vegetables including
grapes, peanuts, cranberries, blueberries, mulberries, and jackfruit. Id Not all sources are
concentrated: grape skins, muscadines and Japanese knotweed are among the most concentrated
sources of it. Id. Resveratrol was first described by Ayurvedic medicine 5,000 years ago as a
cardiotonic. Today the compound is known to provide a number of health benefits, including for
instance anti-tumor, cardiovascular, antibiotic and metabolic indications. Also, anti-aging benefits
have been reported for small animals that ingest resveratrol. Id
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D. COMMON KNOWLEDGE
The final element, common knowledge, almost needs no explanation. If
market participants did not have common knowledge of the market opportunities,
available resources, design alternatives, and predictability of the technology, they
could hardly arrive at near-identical inventions or discoveries in a parallel manner.
The inevitability criterion needs to be applied with caution because hindsight
is so much better than foresight, but one benefit of this four-element analysis is
its nuanced screening for non-obviousness. For example, both inevitable and
non-obvious inventions may have evidence of commercial success and unsolved
needs of the marketplace. But the combined four elements of inevitability
introduced here can distinguish inventions that were truly non-obvious from
those that were not. Essentially, the inevitability criterion fills gaps in
jurisprudence identified five times by KSR as merely the need for "common
sense" when identifying obviousness.
72
Although KSR took a step in the right direction by contemplating market
forces and design needs, the Court did not provide enough analytical structure to
educate a judge who has no formal business training, industry experience, or
invention background.73 Perhaps intuitively the Court recognized that a key
analytical element had yet to be articulated: KSR stopped short of formulating an
all-encompassing test, merely stating that the nature of the problem to be solved
should be considered.74 Thus, the Federal Circuit's motivation analysis, though
not jettisoned, was relegated to a mere subset for obviousness, and room was left
for review of the nature of the problem the inventor was trying to solve.
Inclusion of the four-element inevitability test in the Federal Circuit's
superceded test would make it coextensive with the KSR analysis. The four-
element test codifies the information needed to analyze the problem, solution, and
motivations. What could be more relevant to these than commercial objectives,
the competitive environment, available resources, design limitations, the relative
probability of achieving an invention goal, and the prior art? This is just
"common" sense from an industry perspective.7"
In discussing inevitability, some perspective is in order because the potential
damage is often vastly overestimated, as the following account illustrates. In
the 1990s, I did development work for lithium ion flat cell batteries intended to
be safe, flexible, mostly polymeric, and paper-thin. Early patent claims from all
72 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741-43.
71 Id. at 1740.
v Id. at 1734.
s Note that a consequence of both KSR and the inevitability model is express consideration
of the business context of the person of ordinary skill in the art.
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players were broad, pioneering, and sometimes utterly implausible. Only
electrode materials and metal current collectors seemed to have much maturity in
patented advancements. Much of the relevant electrochemistry and materials
science was a so-called "black box" because it was surprisingly complex and had
not been studied in depth. While there were less than a dozen serious
competitors, most early patents ultimately proved to be useless because the
inventions were inchoate, and nobody could predict what would be operationally
or commercially most viable. Yet within five years lithium ion cells became an
extremely hot field, and dozens of serious competitors emerged. Allowable claims
kept narrowing for all the battery components because everyone crowded toward
variants on the same handful of solutions. It was the same story for anodes,
cathodes, separators, current collectors, electrical leads, solvents, salts, stabilizers,
cell design, safety circuits, packaging, charging protocols, test modules, and
manufacturing processes.
Also, the entire art became much more predictable because academic labs
tackled the basic science and published their results. Their federal research
funding chased the fields that were commercially hot. Corporate researchers
monitored that literature as well as patented developments of competitors. Now
many of those inventions are in the public domain because the patents expired or
were allowed to lapse, and patents issued today in that field are even narrower or
seldom breakthroughs.76
Since then, I have seen the same patterns repeated for internet patents,
pharmaceutical patents in specific sub-fields, and other arts. The battery example
covered a period of several years and relatively unpredictable art. No patent
foreclosed all uses of the only viable approach to the technology, and probably
none ever could.
76 For an example of the narrowness of the recent patents in this area, see, for example, U.S.
Patent No. 7,306,880 (filed Nov. 18, 2003) which was issued December 11, 2007 to Noh. The
assignee is Samsung SDI Co., Ltd (Korea). The patent claims a non-aqueous electrolyte (i.e., liquid
for a lithium ion battery) including twenty to ninety-five volume percent of an ester-based or ether-
based organic solvent, one or more lithium salts, and an additive having at least two carbonate
groups. The stated benefits include increasing the boiling point of the solvent and providing better
passivation (i.e., improved stability of the liquid at the electrode surface). Based on my prior
experience in the field, I would estimate that there are several thousand United States patents on
comparable variants of solvent mixtures for lithium ion batteries. Most of these patents also recite
the use of ethers, esters and or carbonates. Most also recite use of members of the same circle of
lithium salts (developing and manufacturing viable new salts is more difficult than devising new
solvent mixtures), though I conceived and co-invented a patented novel lithium salt. See U.S. Patent
No. 5,597,663 (filed May 30, 1995). And most also recite an improvement in the stability of the
solvent mixture. Thus, given the amount of prior art, newer patents necessarily claim a narrower
range of electrolyte recipes or recite more limitations.
2008]
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Predictable arts are different: the race is faster there. During my tenure at
Motorola, because of the increasing predictability and cost savings for electronics
and computer chips, the pace of competition routinely took new telephone
inventions from high-end lifestyle or early-adopter products to mundane
commodities within just three years of entering the market. Additionally, Atlanta
area software developers tell me their offerings would fall off the market map in
just two years if they stopped innovating.
The reason competition escalates into a race is because all competitors are
adding the same features to their products. So in addition to speed, the
predictable arts seem to have fewer and less creative alternatives for economic
viability than the unpredictable arts enjoy. As a result, key gridlock or bottleneck
problems arise not because of patent proliferation but because a patent emerges
in a "gateway" to new technology horizons, and this has been at issue not just in
the "dry tech" universe but also in predictable biotech.77 So I submit that patent
reform need not be sweeping; it just needs to ensure that any enforced gateway
patents are not for inventions that were inevitable at the time, and that their claim
interpretation conforms to the invention as manifestly understood by the
examiner and applicant during prosecution. Hence, I have introduced merely
three plumb lines for calibrating patent scope from various angles.
V. TESTING ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS
The question now is whether these three plumb lines go far enough. Patent
Failure musters a prodigious amount of economic data to support its startling
" See generalyl, Maureen O'Rourke, Toward a Doctine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REv. 1177, 1179 (2000) (characterizing a patent anti-commons as one in which "rights are held by
so many different patentees that the costs for anyone to accumulate all the required licenses to
enable production [are] prohibitive"). Regarding bioscience patent anti-commons, see Michael A.
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents DeterInnovalion? The Anicommons in BiomedicalResearch, 280
SCI. 698 (1998) (concerning in part the effect of patenting research tools). But such bottlenecks
seem to be rarer than is often assumed, as observed for licenses on diagnostic methods by the
director of the technology transfer office for the federal National Human Genome Research
Institute (NHGRI). See Claire Driscoll, Federal Sector Role, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH
(NIH) SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY (SACGHS)
MEETING TRANSCRIPT (Mar. 26-27,2007), availableathttp://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/mee
tings/Mar2007/transcripts/Driscoll-GenePatents.pdf ("In my 10 or 15 years of doing this, I hear
the same five examples or six examples repeated over and over. We can all name them by heart:
BRCA1 and 2, Myriad Genetics, hemochromatosis; Canavan's disease. It's the same ones."). A false
perception of gridlock may also be caused by transactional costs and inefficiencies arising from the
lack of available rational pricing schemes for patents. See F. Russell Denton, Rolling Equiibriums at
the Pre-Commons Frner. Identifiing Patent Effident Ryaliesfor Complx Products, 13 VA.J. L. & TECH.
(forthcoming Fall 2008), available at http://works.bepress.com/fCrusseU-denton (introducing the
concept of a pseudo-anticommons and explaining its pricing basis).
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conclusions and advocacy for a much broader sweep of patent reform than I
propose.7 8 The reforms of Bessen and Meurer would impose substantial social
costs in the form of implementation logistics and altered commercial
expectations, but might be justified if their conclusions are correct. Thus in this
part, I test some of the book's key economic assumptions to assess whether the
data supports the interpretations that Bessen and Meurer assert.
I begin with their study of a patent "flood" starting in the early 1980s in which
filing rates outstripped the rate of United States research and development (R&D)
spending.79 Those spending observations imply that applicants are abandoning
value-adding research and increasingly filing without merit. My review of PTO
statistics suggests the analysis was too limited. United States patents from foreign
origins accounted for approximately sixty percent of that growth during the same
period,8" consistent with the trend toward globalization. Moreover, one would
not expect those patents to be the result of United States R&D spending.
Another three percent or so of the overall patent growth rate was from university
patents8' that were first authorized for federally subsidized inventions by the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.82 The remaining growth corresponds to an average
increase of roughly 3.5% per year for United States-origin filings. This amount
of growth per year is not a flood, and is almost exactly the same as average annual
growth rates for United States R&D investment in recent decades.8 3 That is not
a crisis.
Bessen and Meurer also suggest that proliferation of patent litigation hurts
investment in technology.' Yet their annual figures for both the number of new
patent applications8" and the number of patent suits filed in district court86 slightly
more than tripled between about 1980 and 2004. This suggests that on a per-
patent basis there is no more confusion, litigiousness, or reluctance to invest in
78 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 235-53.
79 Id. at 63 fig.3.2, 68-69.
' PTO, Extended Year Set - Historic Patents By Country, State, and Year Utility Patents (2007),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cst_ut/1.htn (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
8" Id. (showing trends in overall patent growth rate); PTO, U.S. Colleges and Universities -
UtilityPatent Grants, CalendarYears 1969-2005, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/
taf/univ/univ-toc.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2008) (supervising patenting activity of United States
colleges and universities).
82 Bayh-Doyle Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. % 200-212 (2007); see also 37 C.F.R. § 401 (2008)
(describing scope of Bayh-Doyle Act).
83 See, e.g., THE TASK FORCE OF THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INNOVATION, THE KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY: IS THE UNITED STATES LOSING ITS COMPETmVE EDGE 9 (2005), availabk at http://
www.futureofinnovation.org/PDF/Benchmarks.pdf.
84 BESSEN & MEURER, spra note 7, at 121 fig.6.1.
8" Id. at 68-69.
86 Id at 121 fig.6.1.
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technology now than thirty years ago. Perhaps today patents are litigated sooner
rather than later. The authors note that the per-patent litigation rate within four
years of issue has doubled. 7 Yet only 1.5% of United States patents are
litigated," and in a recent year barely one hundred (less than four percent of
patent cases filed) actually reached trial." Again, evidence for a crisis is thin.
Bessen and Meurer also fear that growth in the number of patents and
claims-especially in software-creates difficulty in adequate clearance searches. 90
That is possible, particularly given their concerns about abstract language that is
difficult to search. 9' Even so, other factors support an alternative interpretation.
The software industry has grown at an enormous rate. For instance, during
the 1990s the packaged software industry grew on average twelve percent per
year, came to represent one percent of the United States gross domestic product,
and has been one of the biggest drivers of United States economic growth
overall.92 Those numbers mean that in a single decade the industry almost
quadrupled in size, so one would expect corresponding proliferation of prior art
that must be searched. Moreover, the 1990s witnessed a mushrooming of United
States technical disclosure across the board, in my own observations, hundreds
if not thousands of new technical journals were launched, and the annual number
of articles submitted for publication continues to escalate, also adding to a
searcher's burden. Yet, due diligence has become easier because of advances in
search technology, online bandwidth, a growth industry in database searches (even
Lexis conducts clearance searches), and the appearance of free searchable PTO
online databases, not to mention other public online databases. Independent
inventors today do their own searches and are better informed of prior art than
their predecessors ten years ago.
Infringement actions today are possibly more disruptive to industries than they
were before the most recent run-up in patent numbers. However my search
turned up no evidence for this proposition. Bessen and Meurer's own pair of
87 Id. at 129 fig.6.3.
88 ARON LEVKO ET AL., PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, A CLOSER LOOK *: 2008 PATENT
LITIGATION STUDY: DAMAGES AWARDS, SUCCESS RATES AND TIME-TO-TRIAL 1 (2008), availabk
athttp://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpubhications.nsf/docid/EBC144CF6220CIE785257424005F
9A2B/$file/2008_patentlitigationstudy.
89 LEONIDAS RALPH MECHUM, ADMIN. OFF. OFTHE U.S. COURTS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.C-4 (2005), availabk at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/c4.pdf (providing statistics on the number of
civil cases terminated in U.S. District Courts in a twelve month period ending September 30, 2005).
90 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 69-77.
91 See id. at 8-11, 56-68 (discussing the difficulty of searching or recognizing the significance
of claims that employ abstract language).
92 SOFTwARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS'N, PACKAGED SOFTWARE INDUSTRY REVENUE AND
GROWTH 1 (2005), available at http://www.siia.net/software/pubs/growth-software05.pdf.
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cited case studies on gridlock pertain to patents that are both expired; each case
involved effects on a new industry that has continued to thrive, and only one
actually affected numerous companies.93 Admittedly, disruptions such as the
more recent BlackBerry patent litigation occasionally appear in a pioneering
field,94 but they are not the norm. This seems to merely confirm that the few
critical "surprise" patents that cause gridlocks or patent thicket phenomena are
transient-but after all, patents are temporary exclusive rights-and that nascent
industries where such patents are asserted are nevertheless robust. There is
reason for optimism: Mature industries with complex products develop efficient
licensing structures such as for pricing (as for pharmaceuticals) 95 and for licensing
mechanism (as for semiconductors).
Bessen and Meurer also discuss findings that today patents are not worth the
cost of their litigation.97 However, they advance no evidence that the routine
costs of litigation for patents are worse than for other types of business lawsuits,
nor do they present information from business decision makers on patent
valuation.98 Curiously they seem to assume that, as a group, patent holders are
either irrational economic actors or cannot calculate risk-reward ratios for
patenting and litigation. That seems inconsistent with traits of business people.99
A report from a major accounting firm throws a different light: Only about 1.5%
of patents are litigated; damage awards, when adjusted for inflation, have
remained fairly constant since 1995; and in recent years patent plaintiff win rates
93 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 194-96. See Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v.
Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (litigating U.S. Patent No. 4,528,643 (filed
Jan. 10, 1983)); Wang Labs, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (litigating
U.S. Patent No. 4,751,664 (filed Apr. 4, 1985)).
94 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 49-50, nn.4-5 (citing NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion,
Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 2d 751, 755 (D. Va. 2003)).
" The total present value of up-front payments, research support, progress payments, and
royalties in pharmaceutical patent licensing deals is about a 50:50 split of expected profits discounted
by statistical failure rates for remaining R&D. F. Russell Denton, Untitled (2008) (unpublished
research, on file with author).
96 In 1996, the Virtual Socket Interface Alliance (VSIA) was formed as a systems-chip standards
group with mutual licensing for 125 firms. F. Russell Denton & PaulJ. Heald, Random Walks, Non-
Cooperative Games, and the Complex Mathematics of Patent Priang 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1184 n.35
(2003). The VSIA ceased operations in 2008. Legacy Documents of the VSI Alliance, http://www.
vsi.org (last visited Oct. 7, 2008).
97 BESSEN & MEURER, smpra note 7, at 95-146.
9' See, e.g., discussion at BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 99 (explaining that they chose not
to use the common research technique of surveying patent owners about patent pricing, and stating
that observing the behavior of patent owners and investors may be a superior way to determine what
those persons really think about patents).
99 Though historically patent valuation has been challenging. See Denton & Heald, supra
note 96.
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have fared as well as ever."° Seemingly, patents provide a value basis that has
been overlooked by assumptions in the cited economic studies.
My conclusions about value are also more optimistic than Bessen and Meurer's
ambivalence about the importance of patents as a commercialization incentive,
which they gauge by events during the Industrial Revolution.' Rather than reach
back to the remote Industrial Revolution and its murky causes, it would have been
far more direct to assess the incentive value of patents in contemporary university
patent procurement and licensing under the Bayh-Dole Act."2 The evidence
from our national experience in university technology transfer clearly indicates
that United States patents are in fact enormously and unambiguously important
as a factor in commercialization.'
03
1oo LEVKO ETAL., supra note 88, at 2-3.
101 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 77-81.
102 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-203 (2001) (the Bayh-Dole Act, which took effect in its initial form
July 1, 1981, authorizing universities to patent inventions whose development was subsidized by
federal funds). Prior to passage of this act, almost all patents on federally funded inventions at
universities were owned by the federal government, which did little with them and was even hostile
toward university partners from which the inventions came. See Howard W. Bremer, Universiy
Technology Transfer Evolution and Revolution, in COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: 50TH
ANNIVERSARY 1948-1998, at 13,17-18,20(1998), available athttp://www.cogr.edu/docs/Annivers
ary.pdf. Consequently (and apparently unlike the industrial revolution) the Bayh-Dole Act is
arguably an almost ideal basis for economic research on the incentive value of patents: It provided
an instantaneous, empirically accessible shift from a no-patent situation to a pro-patent situation.
And being in modem times, the events preceding and following the Bayh-Dole Act offer far more
abundant, accessible, detailed and currently relevant data on the choices and activities of parties than
might be expected to be found for studies of eighteenth and nineteenth century events. Indeed,
because Bayh-Dole was enacted less than thirty years ago, many of the parties who were active in the
relevant fields both before and after the Act presumably still survive and are available for interviews.
103 The years preceding the Bayh-Dole Act were bleak for university inventions. For instance,
from 1963 to 1971 universities made concerted efforts to procure patent agreements with federal
agencies including the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now Health and Human
Services [HSS]) and National Science Foundation, but were rewarded on only very few occasions
with the requested waiver of rights. See Bremer, spra note 102, at 20. Even then, the federal
provisions were so restrictive that technology transfer to the private sector was unworkable: No
commercial firm was willing to risk the necessary expenditure of development funds under the
federally imposed conditions. Id. The Bayh-Dole Act is said to have also been motivated in part by
observations about the contrast between government and contractors in commercializing contractor
inventions. Id at 16-21. Bremer reported that in prior decades the federal government had
accumulated 30,000 patents, of which only five percent had been licensed and even fewer were
commercialized. A 1968 report found that contractor-held inventions in the period 1957 to 1962
were 10.7 times as likely as Government-held inventions to be utilized in products or processes
employed in the private sector for the benefit of the public. Id. at 18 (citing Harbridge House, Inc.,
Government Patent Policy Study for the FCST Committee on Government Patent Policy,
May 15,1968, Vol. II, Parts II and III). Similarly, in 1978 NASA's licensing success rate was under
one percent, whereas the four percent of inventions whose ownership was waived by NASA (in
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In sum, my tests of the economic assumptions of PatentFailure find systematic
blind spots, and the book's diagnosed economic crisis could not be substantiated
as such. But even without an economic crisis, fairness to parties and the public
conceivably could justify sweeping patent reforms. Hence I now evaluate Bessen
and Meurer's assumptions about justice for the parties.
VI. TESTING JURISPRUDENTIAL ASSUMPTIONS
As noted at the outset of this Article, the book's primary legal theory-that
patents do not qualify as property if their boundary lines are inherently
ambiguous-is inconsistent with United States property jurisprudence because
several long-respected types of tangible property also suffer from ambiguity of
ownership scope. I also noted that considering only the needs of inadvertent
infringers is an imbalanced approach to justice.
But, additional themes in the book merit consideration such as the efficacy of
notice and the bad intent of patent applicants in verbally delimiting their
inventions. As to these, Patent Failure compares patent practice to land surveyors
simply ascertaining boundaries." ° In that light any patent claim abstraction is
mere entrapment for trespass, a linguistic ruse by "clever lawyers."'0 5 Yet as
noted above, an applicant's alternative to abstraction is a tedious and expensive
amount of concrete, specific description, or a proliferation of filings. 1°6 And that
is just to protect what others had often never conceived before anyway. Such a
detailed regimen would unduly burden the PTO and the courts, so abstract
definitions are economically efficient. Furthermore, claims must already satisfy
favor of the contractors who invented them) had a commercialization rate in the range of eighteen
to twenty percent. Id at 17. Note that even though the Bayh-Dole Act was in place about the same
time as the formation of the patent-friendly Federal Circuit, id at 23, the incentive effect of private
ownership had already been long observed in federal contracting. Arguably, this prior observation
of commercial incentives provides an empirical control for assessing the effect of changes in the
judiciary. By 1998, university patents had reached three percent of all those issued in the United
States (i.e., just under 2,500 university patents were issued under Bayh-Dole in 1998). Id at 23-24.
And at the end of fiscal year 1996, the university sector reported 10,487 active licenses or options,
representing $365,200,000 annual income, with a license growth rate of 12.9% over the previous year
and an income growth rate of 22 . 1% over the previous year. Id at 25. Doing the math
(i.e., 10,487/2,500) shows that for every new patent issuing, the universities had four existing
contracts on their prior-issued portfolio. This suggests that patents did indeed provide a powerful
incentive not only for the academic licensors, but also for their commercial licensees. That is a stark
contrast to the earlier reticence of commercial parties to license federally funded university
inventions.
104 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 54-55.
105 Id. at 200.
106 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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requirements for expression in full, clear, concise, and exact terms, particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the invention."0 7 Thus, in faulting claim
interpretation principles for allowing abstract terms and inventor linguistic
discretion,' the book imposes much higher standards for drafting and
interpretation than have ever prevailed even for contracts or statutes. This seems
to be fundamentally out of step with United States jurisprudence. 1'
107 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (detailing requirements for specification in patent application).
'0 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 237-39.
0 Law in general does not enjoy the quality of clarity that Bessen and Meurer advocate for
patents. Ambiguity in real property was discussed at the outset of this Article. As to contracts, see
U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (formation of a contract) (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACTS § 33(2)
(1981) (certainty of contract terms). These emphasize that a contract should be treated as reasonably
certain if the language of agreement, interpreted in context and in light of applicable legal rules,
provides enough content to establish an intent to contract, a basis for finding breach, and a means
of providing a remedy. It is an analysis of formation by the parties: there definiteness and remedy
are not only related to each other, but understood in terms of the relationship between the parties.
So contractual definiteness is neither required nor expected by courts to be absolute. The patent-
related reasoning of Bessen and Meurer takes the opposite approach, essentially suggesting that the
frequency of uncertainty by third parties means that the entire patent system has failed. BESSEN &
MEURER, supra note 7, at 46-47, 54-62. If we applied that same reasoning to contracts, we would
not only cancel contracts (e.g., patent licenses) that suffer from too much uncertainty in the eyes of
affected third parties. We would-under Bessen and Meurer's logic-declare that contracts as a
class do not work "as contracts" because the terms of performance and remuneration are so
frequently litigated. And thus, we would demand reinvention of the entire corresponding legal
infrastructure. The common law is more pragmatic than that and has instead honed rules of
interpretation and construction, provided gap fillers, recognized terms implied in law, and so forth.
Seegeneraly RICHARD A. LORD, 11 WILUSTON ON CONTRACTS % 30-32 (4th ed. 2008) (concerning
judicial handling of indefiniteness in contracts). This common law experience in deciding uncertain
contract cases hints that patent reform could be accomplished sufficiently and effectively merely by
refining judicial claim interpretation and construction. Regarding statutory interpretation, the same
concerns apply, and in fact, the textual canons are used similarly for judicial review of contracts and
statutes. For instance, both contractual and statutory interpretation employ the principle of ejusdem
generis (meaning, of the same kinds, class or nature), such that when a list of two or more specific
descriptors are followed by more general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of the general
descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if any, of the specific words that precede them. See,
e.g., IA NORMANJ. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (6th ed. 2000) (principles
of statutory interpretation). The use of textual canons in any field of law is not necessarily an easy
task: A rational opposite exists for each of the textual canons. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theogy of Appellate Decision and the Ruks of Cannons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395 (1950), republished with permission at 5 GREEN BAG 297 (2002) (arguing that every canon
had a "counter-canon" that would lead to the opposite interpretation of the statute). Yet the law
does not despair over choices involving canon mirror images, or over the frequency of public
confusion concerning statutory meaning. Rather than condemnation on the grounds that statutes
do not work "as statutes," the law has cultivated canons that salvage statutes to the extent feasible.
The extent to which American jurisprudence has coexisted with uncertainty and unpredictability is
further revealed in the twentieth century formation and wide influence of the legal realism
28
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Though Bessen and Meurer acknowledge that technical complexity is partly
responsible for difficulty in ascertaining patent scope,"' they apply their surveying
metaphor too literally. Patent practice is to surveying what major surgery is to
plumbing. A surveyor has two years of college training, and after twenty years on
the job earns $26.89 per hour ($70,000 per year).' Boundaries differ but land is
land. By contrast, every invention brings a new learning curve and strategic
business issues. Patent attorneys have technical specializations, a specialty bar
exam, a unique supplemental ethical code, and over three times as much
professional training as a surveyor (or even eight times including advanced
degrees, fellowships, and clerkships). This exceeds the credentials of most law or
science professors. In addition to their more substantial training, patent attorneys
also earn more money. For example, junior patent partners bill out over $1
million per year. This comparison suggests most difficulties with notice of scope
may concern expertise, not legalistic gamesmanship.
Still, it could be that many smart-but unethical-people gravitate to patent law
because inventors will pay them well to hide the scope of inventions. If so, one
might expect a substantial instance of judicial findings of inequitable conduct
among patentees. By contrast, over a fifteen year period, the Federal Circuit held
only forty or so times that there had been inequitable conduct,"2 representing less
than one percent of all appealed patent cases.' 3
Or, hypothetically, patent attorneys might be lawfully gaming the system. For
instance, Bessen and Meurer aver that patent examination is stacked in favor of
movement, which argued that the unpredictability of adjudication was evidence that rules were not
the actual basis of law. Seegeneraly Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1915 (2005) (distinguishing between theories of law and theories of adjudication).
The present paper does not advocate legal realism, nor does it condone sloppy drafting in contracts,
statutes, or property descriptions. Nevertheless, Bessen and Meurer's largely unforgiving standards
for certainty in patents appear to be fundamentally at odds with the historic American recognition
that a substantial amount of uncertainty is inevitable in every field of jurisprudence. In fact, legal
clients depend on the variability of outcomes, because without it the relative skill of their lawyers
would play no role at all in determining which side wins at litigation.
10 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 55-56.
... See Payscale, http://www.payscale.com/research/US/Job=LandSurveyor (last visited
Oct. 8, 2008).
112 Robert Pear, Patent Law Battle a Boon to Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, at Cl, available
athttp://www.nydmes.com/2008/04/30/business/3patent.html?_r=l&oref=slogin; Posting of
Mary E. Doyle, Senior Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary, Palm to http://blog.palm.
com/palm/2008/05/a-good-read-on.html (May 6, 2008, 07:35 EST).
113 Based in part on the average annual volume of Federal Circuit patent cases (typically
about 400 per year). United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Patent Infringement
Appeals from the U.S. District Courts, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf.PatentFiingsHistorica
11998-2007.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2008) (charting the filing and disposition data for appeals in
patent infringement cases from 1998 through 2007).
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inventors.' 4  However, the first office action in a case generally rejects
claims-often all claims-and only half of applications eventually issue as
patents."' The book also alleges that Federal Circuit reversal of claim
construction is excessive in ignoring expert testimony from trials."16 But those
experts are just hired guns, and trial judges openly admit to being stymied by
technologies and complex, unfamiliar patent law."'
Bessen and Meurer also distrust continuation applications (CONs) as devices
that may hide claims to be added in the future."' Yet, if hiding is the intent,
CONs are poor covers. Every first-year patent associate is told-both for
prosecution and diligence-that novel, unclaimed subject matter in a pending
application may be claimed in amendments and continuations." 9 Most CONs are
published electronically while pending, so the full text is freely and easily
searchable by routines that screen the entire PTO database at once.12 ° At least in
my experience, both law firms and in-house lawyers scan the full text databases
routinely (or pay a vendor such as Lexis to do it) when preparing opinion letters
for clearance (i.e., to confirm that a product about to enter the market will not
infringe a third party patent) and for validity searches. The full text of any
published U.S. patent application, including a CON, is searchable, and in fact,
pending applications are commonly flagged by search criteria. With the
114 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 56.
115 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL
YEAR2007 110 tbl.2,113 tbl.6 (2007), availableathttp://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/
2007annualreport.pdf (indicating the length of prosecution time is three or more years). See also Cecil
D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Apphcalions and Performance of The U.S. Patent
Office, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 1-21 (2001) (comparing deduced numbers of continuation applications
to infer that issued claims are eventually obtained by continuation applications for most abandoned
original applications; yet, not reflecting the fact that many original applications have a large plurality
of issued continuation patents, while many others receive none); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven N.
Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp, 23, 34 (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper
No. 999098, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=999098 [hereinafter Lemley & Sampat]
(reporting that three-fourths of original applications result in at least one patent, but about forty
percent of issued cases have narrowed claims).
116 See e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 55, 58-61.
117 See, e.g., James F. Holderman & Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation Pre&cament in the United
States 111.C-D (Mar. 26,2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available athttp://www.
jltp.uiuc.edu/works/Holderman.htm) (describing a federal "patent pilot project" bill that would have
enhanced patent expertise at the district court level by consolidating those cases to voluntary judicial
panels); see also H.R. 34, 110th Cong. (2007) (passing in the House but remaining in committee in the
Senate).
11 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 62-63.
"1 See, e.g., MPEP, supra note 13, §§ 608 (disclosure), 2163.05 (changes to the scope of claims).
120 PTO, USPTO Patent Application Full Text and Image Database, http://appftl.uspto.gov/
netahtml/PTO/search-bool.htr (last visited Oct. 7, 2008).
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information from the patent document, the prosecution status and history are
then routinely checked for any particularly relevant prior art using the PTO's
public PAIR database. 2'
CONs are much more mundane than their portrayal by Bessen and Meurer.
Notably, half of what are generically called CONs are divisional carve-outs forced
on applicants by examiners to narrow searches." About another twenty percent
are requests for continuing examination."2 These extend prosecution without
broadening claims. Furthermore, if a CON hid claims, a defense of prosecution
laches would be available where unreasonable delay prejudiced the infringer's
rights.124 Ironically, my experience in practice is that CONs are most widely used
in chemical and pharmaceutical cases, patents the book criticizes least.12 CONs
provide alternatives to examiner restriction classes, buy time to run clinical trials,
are a thrifty alternative to filing many parallel applications (which is prohibitively
expensive for new bioscience ventures), and have other common non-hiding uses.
Bessen and Meurer also distrust unpublished applications.126 Intuitively, these
might merit more concern than CON status. Regrettably, published PTO
statistics do not sort applications by publication status or basis for non-
publication.127 Yet, insidious litigation trends by patentees who had kept filings
unpublished could readily be identified because prosecution histories are public
121 Accessible at http://portal.uspto.gov/extemal/portal/pair (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
122 See Lemley & Sampat, supra note 115, at 37 tbl.19.
123 See id at 36 tbl.18.
124 See Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found. LP (SymbolIV), 422
F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that the finding of prosecution laches was not an abuse of
discretion where a patentee's competitors sought declaration that patents were invalid,
unenforceable, and not infringed).
123 Lemley & Sampat, supra note 115, at 36 tbl.18, 39 (noting that empirically observed CON
uses vary by industry).
126 See BESSEN & MEuRER, supra note 7, at 243 (recommending publication of all applications and
all claim additions and revisions). Provisional applications (35 U.S.C. § 111(b) (2000)) and design patent
applications (35 U.S.C. § 16) are unpublished. Regular utility applications are published unless the
applicant opts out at filing using Form PTO/SB/35. Form PTO/SB/35 (2008), available at http://
www.uspto.gov/web/forms/sbOO35.pdf. Applications are not published if before the slated date they
become abandoned or otherwise non-pending, or are subject to a secrecy order under 35 U.S.C. § 181
or for national security. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(A), (d) (2000). See general4 Karen Tyson, Ovniew of
Eigbteen Month Publication, USPTO TODAY ONLINE, Jan. 2001, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
dcom/olia/aipa/overview.ofeighteen monthipublication2l .htm; 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2) (B) (2000) (opt
out for U.S.-only applications); First Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L No. 106-113, 113
Star. 1536 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 273 (2000)) (transition period implementing publication for
applications with priority after November 2000).
12 Lemley & Sampat, spra note 115, at 11, 33 n.49 (alluding to their own deduction of trends
for unpublished applications from other data, and noting that opt-out from publication is non-
randomly distributed across applications). Their cited Appendix B reporting trends in opting out
of publication is... unpublished. Id
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after issuance. An infringement defense of prosecution laches could apply here,
too, and I have noticed no published data correlating litigiousness with prior non-
publication status. So in assuming that contemporary unpublished applications
are merely a new incarnation of submarines, the book seems to rely on an
untested hypothesis.
In light of Bessen and Meurer's discussion of hold-ups over the Freeny E-
Data patent, 2 ' market gridlock might be cited as evidence of abuse by hidden
patents. 9 Gridlock concerns have also arisen concerning patent thickets,
especially in biotech products. 3 ° But gridlock can have other sources. Microsoft
executives have told me that third parties representing thousands of narrow
patents, many of dubious applicability or quality, seek royalties that in the
aggregate could exceed all anticipated revenues from their products, but the
company could find no financial science addressing the problem.13" ' This bogs
down licensing. I show elsewhere that in fact financial quandaries over royalty
sums or splits explain much of gridlock, and I show how to compute and
partition royalties to overcome the problem.'32 Hence, pricing dilemmas should
not be confused with patent failures.
VII. CONCLUSION
I proposed three new metrics as plumb lines to realign the public notice of a
patent's scope objectively with a clarified and reasonably ascertainable scope of
how the examiner and inventor manifestly viewed it during prosecution, and with
the market's reasonably ascertainable perception of non-obviousness at the time
of the filing. In order to minimize social costs of implementation, this model
attempted to identify the smallest and most neutral legal changes that could rectify
the root causes of the notice problem while leaving other aspects of patent law
unaltered. I believe the solution addresses Bessen and Meurer's primary
complaint in a nuanced way.
I attempted to assess whether more extensive triage is warranted in light of the
data and observations set forth by those authors to justify their astonishing
128 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 194.
129 Id. at 1-2, 182-83.
" See, e.g., Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 698-701 (contending that the increase in
intellectual property rights in biomedical research may lead to a reduction in useful products).
"' Telephone interview with Matt Gordon, Director of IP Acquisitions, Microsoft Corp.;
Yongbai Choi, IP Acquisitions & Investments Manager, Microsoft Corp.; and Dr. Allen L. Brown,
Jr., Software Architect/Senior Program Manager, Web Data Access Group, Microsoft Corp.
(Nov. 2006).
132 Denton, supra note 77.
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reform proposals.' Although my present analysis is quite limited, I find their
diagnosis of a patent-based economic crisis is troubled by systematically flawed
assumptions. When viewed in what I suggest is a proper context, the economic
data indicates the patent system largely works as historically intended, or at least
has held steady in its operating efficiency. Alternatively, I assessed whether
principles of fairness and equity alone would justify a broader slate of reform than
my three plumb lines. Here, I find that Patent Failure's diagnosis of unfairness to
inadvertent infringers relies on jurisprudential ideals for clarity, transparency, and
interpretation that have been historically unattainable not only in United States
patent law but in much broader fields of United States law generally.
Nevertheless, I can agree that there is still room for practical improvement in
clarifying patent scope.
Thus, I conclude that ongoing notice problems cited in Patent Failure require
only recalibration with unobtrusive plumb lines, not downsizing of patent rights
with the book's wrecking ball model. Notice, after all, is about line-drawing. And
errors in making lines plumb are easier to fix than demolition mistakes.
"' BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 7, at 234-53.
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